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T HE regulation of banking in the United States has two main
components. The first is the regulation of banks themselves. In-
cluded in this first category of regulations are the scheme of federal
insurance of deposits,' entry restrictions, geographic restrictions on
the location of branches,' restrictions on the business activities
banks can undertake,4 minimum capital requirements, 5 and lending
limits.' Until recently, the interest rate that banks could pay on de-
posits was also strictly regulated.7
t The authors are indebted to Christopher DeMuth and Alan Frankel for their invaluable
assistance and thank Walter Blum, William Landes, Geoffrey Miller, Richard Posner, and
Alan Sykes for helpful comments on previous drafts. We also thank participants in law and
economics workshops at Harvard University, Stanford University, and the University of
Toronto and participants in the finance workshop at the Kellogg School of Management,
Northwestern University.
* Professor of Law and Business and Director, Law and Economics Program, University of
Chicago.
**Lecturer in Law, Univeristy of Chicago Law School and President, Lexecon Inc.
*** Vice President and Senior Economist, Lexecon Inc.
See 12 U.S.C. §§ 1811-1832 (1982).
2 See 12 U.S.C. § 27 (1982).
3 See 12 U.S.C. § 36 (1982).
4 See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 24(7) (Supp. 1I 1985).
5 See Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. v. First Lincolnwood Corp., 439 U.S. 234
(1978); Bank Holding Companies and Change in Bank Control, 12 C.F.R. § 225 (1986) (Ap-
pendix A-Capital Adequacy Guidelines for Bank Holding Companies and State Member
Banks), amended 51 Fed. Reg 40,969 (Nov. 12, 1986); E. Symons & J. White, Banking Law.
Teaching Materials 287-91 (1984).
1 See 12 U.S.C. § 84 (1982).
Congress has repealed the prohibition on the payment of interest on deposits. Depository
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The second major component of banking regulation is the regula-
tion of bank holding companies. Nonbank subsidiaries of bank hold-
ing companies face activity restrictions similar to those faced by
banks.8 Opportunities for geographic expansion are also limited.' Fi-
nally, bank holding companies can be formed only if they can
demonstrate that they are adequately capitalized and meet other
requirements.10
Much of the current structure of banking regulation in the United
States has its intellectual origins in the bank failures of the Great
Depression and the regulatory ethic of the New Deal.1" During the
Depression it was commonplace to assume that bank (and other
business) failures had been caused by "excessive competition" dur-
ing the boom years of the 1920's. Under this view, banks had con-
tributed to the economic collapse by engaging in "cutthroat" inter-
est-rate wars in an effort to lure depositors from each other; this in
turn had forced the banks to engage in increasingly risky activities
such as securities underwriting to pay the higher interest rates. This
excessive competition theory was often coupled with a "conflict of
interest" theory: involvement in securities activities led banks to
make unsound credit decisions in order to manipulate stock prices
and ball out affiliates. Finally, the spectacle of widespread bank
failures led many observers to conclude that bank failures were con-
tagious: the failure of one bank could undermine public confidence
in other banks, causing them to fail as well.
The regulatory response to these perceived problems was both
different from and similar to other New Deal programs. It was dif-
ferent in that the creation of federal deposit insurance was unique
among New Deal programs. Yet what is most striking about the
New Deal program of banking regulation is its similarity to the pro-
grams of public utility and common carrier regulation, many of
Institutions Deregulation Act of 1980, Pub L. No. 96-221, Title II, § 202, 94 Stat. 142, 142
(codified at 12 U.S.C. § 3501 (1982)).
S See 12 U.S.C. § 1843 (1982).
9 See 12 U.S.C. § 1842(d) (1982).
10 See authorities cited supra note 5.
11 An influential contemporary account of the "banking problem" and the need for in-
creased federal regulation was L. Brandeis, Other People's Money and How the Bankers Use
It (1914). See also E. Hawley, The New Deal and the Problem of Monopoly 3-16, 304-24
(1966) (discussing the introduction of banking and securities laws as a response to the concen-
tration of financial power in the early 1930's). Some banking regulation, particularly entry
controls, predated the New Deal. See generally H. Magee, A Treatise on the Law of National
and State Banks 1-14 (3d ed. 1921) (discussing state and national authority to regulate entry
and banking activity).
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which (such as airline, motor carrier, and telecommunications regu-
lation) were established during the same period. The essential fea-
tures of the New Deal banking regulation were entry control, price
control, market allocation through the forced separation of commer-
cial banking from investment banking and securities activities, and
close supervision of investments and related activities. These were
the essential features of airline, surface transportation, and commu-
nications regulation as well.
The similarity of these regulatory policies was not coincidental.
The New Deal's diagnosis of the ills of the banking industry was
identical to its diagnosis of the ills of the Depression economy gen-
erally. Private markets were naturally unstable and prone to abuses
of both "excess competition" and conflicts of interest. The "cure,"
therefore, consisted of explicit government protection against mar-
ket competition through controlled entry and pricing that would
make banks and other firms more "stable"; segmented markets to
reduce the potential for conflicts of interest and to provide addi-
tional stability by reducing competition; and close supervision of the
business dealings of regulated firms. In the transportation, commu-
nications, and power industries, in the agricultural sector, and in
manufacturing industries generally during the National Recovery
Act period, the economic prescription of the New Deal consisted of
establishing market-by-market, government-administered cartels.
This was the prescription in the financial services sector as well.
But this simple tale of excessive competition inevitably leading to
economic collapse has long since been discarded by most economists
and economic historians. Moreover, the government-enforced cartels
erected during the 1930's have proven unstable over time due to the
tendency of regulated firms to engage in service competition (e.g.,
the provision of "free" drinks on airlines) and, most importantly,
the incentive of regulated and nonregulated firms alike to innovate
around government-created restrictions in order to meet consumer
demand (e.g., the development of the trucking and cable television
industries). These developments have led to the breakdown and
substantial repeal of government-created cartels in the airline, tele-
communications, and motor carrier industries, among others.
The same pattern has been observed in banking. Although the
government-enforced cartel in banking was relatively stable through
the 1960's, it became increasingly unstable in the 1970's. High nomi-
nal interest rates and advances in data processing made it profitable
for increasing numbers of firms to enter the financial services indus-
try and compete with commercial banks. This trend has continued
1987]
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into the 1980's. In the current environment, banks now face formi-
dable competition in virtually every product or service they offer. 12
This increased competition has substantially eroded, if not obliter-
ated altogether, the effectiveness of much banking regulation. Regu-
lations limiting the payment of interest (price controls) were ren-
dered obsolete by the development of money market funds and
eventually repealed; technological innovations such as automated
tellers have made restrictions on branching increasingly meaning-
less; the proliferation of "nonbank banks" owned by diversified fi-
nancial firms facilitates the complete evasion of the geographic, ac-
tivity, and capital adequacy restrictions of the Bank Holding
Company Act. 13 Market forces, therefore, have had much the same
effect in banking as in other industries.
What is distinctive about banking, however, is the widespread
perception that banks are somehow different from other types of
firms and the related perception that unrestrained competition in
the provision of financial services imposes large social costs.,4 Thus,
while many applaud the effect of increased competition in, say, the
trucking industry as resulting in superior services for consumers at
lower prices, increased competition in financial services is often
viewed as undesirable. Put differently, the "excessive competition"
" For a discussion of the market shares of banks and other types of financial in-
termediaries in a variety of different product lines, see Pavel & Rosenblum, Banks and Non-
banks: The Horse Race Continues, 9 Econ. Persp. 3 (1985); Blueprint for Reform: The Report
of the Task Group on Regulation of Financial Services 17 (1984), reprinted in Bush Task
Group Report on Regulation of Financial Services: Blueprint for Reform (pt. 1), Hearings
Before a Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Government Operations, 99th Cong., 1st Sess.
297, 312 (1985) [hereinafter Bush Task Group Report].
13 The Bank Holding Company Act defines a bank as an institution "which (1) accepts
deposits that the depositor has a legal right to withdraw on demand, and (2) engages in the
business of making commercial loans." 12 U.S.C. § 1841(c) (1982). A nonbank bank is a finan-
cial institution that performs one but not both of these functions. The Supreme Court has
held that nonbank banks do not fall within the scope of the Bank Holding Company Act. See
Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. v. Dimension Fin. Corp., 106 S. Ct 681 (1986).
14 The chief spokesman for this view has been Paul A. Volcker, Chairman of the Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System. See, e.g., Non-bank Banks: Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Financial Institutions Supervision, Regulation, and Insurance of the House
Comm. on Banking, Finance, and Urban Affairs, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 14 (1985) (statement of
Paul A. Volcker). For a sampling of Chairman Volcker's views with respect to the separation
of banking and commerce generally, see Comprehensive Reform in the Financial Services In-
dustry- Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 99th
Cong., 1st Sess. 110 (1985) (attachment to statement of Paul A. Volcker); Competitive Equity
in the Financial Services Industry: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing,
and Urban Affairs, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 1583 (1984) (statement of Paul A. Volcker); Bush
Task Group Report, supra note 12, at 178-276 (statement of Paul A. Volcker).
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theory of the New Deal still survives in banking, although it has
been discredited in other areas.
Much has been written on various aspects of banking regulation,
but the critical question-are banks different from other types of
firms, and, if so, how-has, surprisingly, been almost completely ig-
nored.15 We attempt to answer this question. In Part I we discuss
what a bank is and how the social costs of bank failures compare
with the social costs of other types of business failures. We demon-
strate that the differences between banks and other firms are far
less obvious than commonly assumed. Part II considers how federal
deposit insurance addresses the prisoner's dilemma facing bank de-
positors. We also discuss the moral hazard created by federal de-
posit insurance and ways to minimize this problem, including the
use of private deposit insurance. Bankruptcy law as an alternative
to federal deposit insurance is also considered in Part II.
The remainder of the article selectively analyzes some of the
other major aspects of banking regulation. In Part III we scrutinize
the various activity restrictions that, for example, attempt to force a
separation between banking and securities activities and to prevent
banks and their affiliates from selling insurance. We show that
neither the unique characteristics of banks nor the moral hazard
created by federal deposit insurance imply that banks and their
subsidiaries should be limited to engaging in "traditional" banking
activities. We also refute the widespread view that banks, perhaps
because of the existence of deposit insurance, have incentives to en-
gage in cross-subsidies and predatory practices of various types in
unrelated lines of business. In Part IV, we critically analyze entry
controls, restrictions on geographic expansion, and the dual banking
system. Finally, in Part V we demonstrate that it is misguided to
regulate the capital structure of holding companies to ensure that
holding companies act as "sources of strength" for their subsidiary
banks.
15 Robert Clark has written a stimulating set of articles on the distinctive characteristics of
financial intermediaries as a group. See Clark, The Regulation of Financial Holding Compa-
nies, 92 Harv. L. Rev. 787 (1979) [hereinafter Financial Holding Companies]; Clark, The
Soundness of Financial Intermediaries, 86 Yale L.J. 1 (1976); see also Clark, The Four Stages
of Capitalism: Reflections on Investment Management Treatises (Book Review), 94 Harv. L.
Rev. 561, 564-65 (1981) (the financial intermediary is the characteristic institution of the
third stage of capitalism). Here we focus on the differences between banks and other types of
firms, including other types of financial intermediaries.
1987l
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I. ARE BANKS DIFFERENT?
The claim that competition is harmful in banking, but not, for
example, in trucking, rests on the premise that banks are different
from other types of firms. In particular, the widespread perception
that government regulation is more important in banking than in
other sectors of the economy appears to rest on the fear that an
unregulated banking market would be subject to contagious bank
failures. This part addresses the question of whether banks are in
fact different from other types of firms.1"
A. What Is a Bank?
Banks are firms that provide a particular bundle of financial ser-
vices. The liquidity services provided to depositors, most notably
checking services and immediate access to deposited funds, are ex-
amples. In addition, banks provide a variety of services through
their lending activities. They assess credit risk and, when appropri-
ate, fund and monitor investment projects.
In a world of perfect information and zero transaction costs, there
would be no role for banks or other financial intermediaries. Invest-
ment projects with a positive net present value would be known to
all and could be costlessly financed. There would be no need for
loan monitoring once funds had been advanced. Nor would there be
a demand for the liquidity services provided by banks. The demand
for highly liquid, low-risk securities (deposits) could be easily met.
Entrepreneurs would simply raise part of the funds required for an
investment project by selling deposit-like securities that give the
holder the right to redeem the security at face value on demand.17
Banks and other financial intermediaries therefore owe their exis-
tence to information and transaction costs. Moreover, banks are dis-
tinct from other types of financial intermediaries in that a high per-
centage of their liabilities, deposits payable on demand, are liquid,
while a high percentage of their assets, long term commercial loans,
are illiquid. By contrast, money market funds have liquid assets and
liabilities; pension funds have illiquid assets and liabilities. No other
" Although our discussion focuses on banks, the analysis applies to other types of deposi-
tory institutions such as savings and loan associations.
1 For further discussion of financial intermediation in a world of perfect information and
zero transaction costs, see Black, Bank Funds Management in an Efficient Market, 2 J. Fin.
Econ. 323 (1975).
306 [Vol. 73:301
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entity combines liquid liabilities with illiquid assets in the same
manner as banks.
The survival of banks as an organizational form suggests that
banks provide valuable, cost-reducing services not perfectly dupli-
cated elsewhere in the economy. The organization of banks, how-
ever, raises interesting and not altogether resolved questions. Why
do banks hold illiquid assets (loans) against their liquid liabilities
(deposits)? Why do they not hold primarily liquid assets, in the
manner of a money market mutual fund? Even if there is a reason
for banks to hold illiquid assets, why do banks combine loan-making
with deposit-issuing? There are many types of illiquid assets that a
bank might hold. What is the nature of the complementarity or
"synergy" between deposit-issuing and loan-making?
The tendency of banks to hold illiquid assets is to some extent a
product of federal deposit insurance, which is discussed more fully
below.18 As many observers have noted, deposit insurance allows
banks to substitute government-backed insurance for liquid assets
as a means of backing their liquid liabilities. Deposit insurance,
however, is not the only explanation: banking has never been con-
ducted on a one-hundred-percent reserve basis. Another possible ex-
planation is that, by combining higher yielding illiquid assets with
liquid deposit liabilities, banks provide consumers with liquidity at
lower cost than if banks invested exclusively in lower yielding liquid
assets. By holding the deposits of numerous consumers, a bank
pools the risk of withdrawal demands. The benefit of this pooling is
the ability to invest a portion of deposits in higher yielding illiquid
assets. Competition among banks ensures that depositors share in
the benefit of this pooling-in the form of higher direct or indirect
interest payments on their deposits. 9
B. Bank Runs and the Prisoner's Dilemma
Bank depositors face a form of the prisoner's dilemma. Rational
bank depositors realize that, although individual depositors can
withdraw funds at any time, depositors as a class cannot demand
payment simultaneously because the bank has insufficient funds on
hand to meet all of its obligations. Moreover, rational depositors re-
alize that any mass withdrawals of funds may force the bank to take
"8 See infra text accompanying notes 39-48.
" Diamond and Dybvig emphasize this aspect of banking, calling it the "transformation of
illiquid assets into liquid liabilities." See Diamond & Dybvig, Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance,
and Liquidity, 91 J. Pol. Econ. 401, 402 (1983).
19871
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value-reducing actions such as liquidating commercial loans at dis-
tress prices or calling loans prematurely. Thus, it is in the interest
of depositors as a group not to withdraw large amounts simultane-
ously. But if some class of depositors does decide, for whatever rea-
son, to withdraw assets from the bank, other depositors will ration-
ally conclude that they must do the same to avoid being left with
nothing. The result of such a "run" on the bank's assets may be the
failure of a previously solvent bank to the detriment of depositors as
a group.
Financial panics leading to runs are generally perceived as a phe-
nomenon unique to banking. This perception is false. An analogous
prisoner's dilemma confronts the short-term creditors of any firm.
Suppose a firm is viable in the sense that the going-concern value of
its assets exceeds their liquidation value. If all of the firm's creditors
continue to extend credit, its operations continue uninterrupted,
and all claimants are better off. But suppose that some short-term
unsecured creditors decide, for whatever reason, to withdraw their
credit. There is then the possibility of a panic. Short-term un-
secured creditors may worry that if they wait, other short-term un-
secured creditors may "put" their claims to the firm and receive
payment in full, depleting the firm's liquid assets. To meet further
claims, the firm would be forced to liquidate other (illiquid) assets.
At some point there is the possibility that the liquidation value of
the firm's remaining assets may fall short of the face value of the
unsecured creditors' claims. Fearing this outcome, short-term un-
secured creditors may rationally adopt a "me-first" attitude and de-
mand payment as soon as possible. The resulting "run" on the as-
sets of-the firm can cause an otherwise solvent firm to fail.20
Thus, nothing in economic theory suggests that runs are peculiar
to the banking industry. But the distinctive structure of banks' as-
sets and liabilities suggests that the prisoner's dilemma faced by
bank depositors-and hence the incentive of depositors to engage in
me-first behavior-is more severe than that faced by creditors of
other types of firms. As noted above, banks promise most depositors
immediate access to their funds21 but lend large portions of these
2" In Part II we discuss the economic function of the bankruptcy laws in minimizing the
incentive to engage in me-first behavior.
21 Approximately 75% of the liabilities of commercial banks in the United States are in the
form of deposits, and a significant portion of these are demand deposits. See Bureau of Cen-
sus, U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Statistical Abstract of the United States 495 (1986) (table 827).
Demand deposits are "instantly putable" debt. unlike the usual creditor of a manufacturing
firm, the holder of a demand.deposit claim on a bank can "put" the claim to the bank and
[Vol. 73:301
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funds to create illiquid assets. As a result, the ratio of current assets
to current liabilities is much lower at banks than in the nonfinancial
corporate sector."2 For this reason, and because banks have a very
large percentage of liabilities in the form of deposits that are in-
stantly putable,23 bank depositors are more likely than short-term
unsecured creditors of other firms to adopt a me-first attitude at
the first signs of financial distress. 2 4
A separate question is why banks are organized in a way that in-
creases the risk of me-first behavior. Other forms of organization are
conceivable. For example, one alternative sometimes proposed is
one-hundred-percent reserve banking, in which banks would hold
only liquid assets.2 5 This clearly would eliminate the risk of bank
runs but would either transfer to other firms the task of transform-
ing illiquid assets into liquid liabilities (in which case the risk of
runs would be shifted, not avoided 26) or, as discussed above,27 would
raise the cost of providing customers with liquidity services. An-
other alternative might be some modification in the basic contract
between banks and depositors that would allow banks to suspend
the convertibility of depositors' claims into cash. If banks could sus-
pend convertibility, economically viable banks could stop incipient
runs, which in turn would reduce depositors' incentives to rush to
the teller window in the first place. 8 Such a contract would give
demand repayment whenever the holder chooses.
" The average "current ratio" in the nonfinancial sector has been approximately 1.5 in
recent years. In contrast, the ratio of current assets to current liabilities (i.e., deposits) at
commercial banks has been slightly under 0.5. Compare Economic Report of the President
334 (1985) (nonfinancial corporate sector) with Bureau of Census, supra note 21, at 495 (table
827) (banking sector). In calculating the current ratio for banks, current assets are defined as
the sum of securities, federal funds sold and securities purchased under agreements to resell,
and cash.
See supra note 21.
U Put differently, the probability of bankruptcy is greater for banks than for other types of
firms. For an interesting discussion of the factors that make bankruptcy more and less likely,
see Bulow & Shoven, The Bankruptcy Decision, 9 Bell J. Econ. 437 (1978). They observe that,
in the case of a viable firm whose going-concern value exceeds its liquidation value, "liquida-
tion occurs only because there is a conflict of interest among the various claimants of the firm
and an asymmetry in their negotiating and controlling abilities." Id. at 438. They conclude
that "[i]n general, a longer-term debt structure, an asset portfolio with a higher percentage of
cash or liquid assets, and a more variable future return all increase the circumstances under
which the firm will continue operations." Id. at 454.
25 See, e.g., Kareken, Federal Bank Regulatory Policy: A Description and Some Observa-
tions, 59 J. Bus. 3, 39-40 (1986).
" Diamond & Dybvig, Banking Theory, Deposit Insurance, and Bank Regulation, 59 J.
Bus. 55, 65-66 (1986).
27 See supra text accompanying note 19.
28 See Diamond & Dybvig, supra note 19, at 410-13.
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banks an option very similar to the option that nonbanking firms
have-the option to suspend payments to creditors and seek reor-
ganization through bankruptcy, as we discuss in more detail in Part
11.29
C. Are Bank Failures Contagious?
The conventional wisdom is that the banking system is inherently
unstable because bank failures are contagious-the failure of one
bank will inevitably lead to the failure of other banks. The mecha-
nism by which this chain reaction supposedly occurs, however, is
typically unexplained. The most obvious situation in which a chain
reaction could occur is where banks are direct investors in a failed
bank. Where such direct links exist, the effect of a bank failure on
investor banks will depend on the amount invested, the amounts
available for distribution to creditors, and relative priorities among
claimants. Apart from this direct investment situation, however, it
is not clear why a run on any one bank should necessarily unnerve
depositors at others.
Consider the case of a bank that fails because a dishonest director
embezzles all of its funds. The reason for the bank failure is firm-
specific. Depositors of other banks have no reason to believe that
their claims are less secure than before. Indeed, other banks may
benefit from firm-specific bank failures because deposits may be
shifted to surviving banks.
Now consider a bank that fails because a high percentage of its
loans in one sector of the economy are not repaid. This reason for
bank failure can inform depositors of other banks with similar types
of loans that their banks might experience some financial distress in
the future.30 Depositors of these banks then have an increased in-
centive to engage in me-first behavior. s But the incentive to with-
draw assets from the bank is created by the information conveyed
29 See infra text accompanying notes 52-57.
30 We do not suggest that depositors can distinguish causes of bank failure costlessly. But
information about the causes of bank failure does exist. Bank performance is monitored by
large creditors, equity investors, analysts, and regulators. The information acquired from this
monitoring process can be used by market participants to distinguish causes of bank failures.
For an empirical demonstration that the cause of bank failure is considered important by
market participants, see Aharony & Swary, Contagion Effects of Bank Failures: Evidence
from Capital Markets, 56 J. Bus. 305 (1983).
Si Although our discussion here focuses on banks, it is again important to recognize that
the incentive to engage in me-first behavior is not limited to creditors of banks. Nonbank
failures can provide information that causes creditors of nonbanking firms to engage in me-
first behavior with respect to those firms as well.
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by the bank failure, not the bank failure itself. The same signal can
come from other sources. Indeed, there is no reason why depositors
at a bank should be more unsettled by a failure of another bank
than by the failure of a manufacturing firm. The failure of a large
local manufacturing firm may send a signal about the probable
quality of a local bank's loan portfolio that is far more relevant to
depositors than the signal sent by the failure of a bank in another
state. Thus, the source of instability in the banking system is not
that bank failures are inherently contagious but that financial dis-
tress in the economy disproportionately affects banks because of
their asset structure and susceptibility to me-first behavior.32
D. The Potential Macroeconomic Effects of Bank Failures
Having discussed why banks are more likely to fail in times of
economic downturn than other types of firms, we now turn to the
question of whether widespread bank failures impose greater social
costs than other types of business failures. Most economists believe
that widespread bank failures do impose disproportionate social
costs because of the role banks play in the money supply process.
Widespread bank failures may cause the money supply to drop un-
expectedly.3 3 This is a matter of concern because the empirical evi-
dence suggests that unexpected drops in the money supply cause
unemployment to rise and output to fall. 4 Thus, widespread bank
failures that cause an unexpected decline in the money supply have
the potential to worsen, or even cause, an economic downturn.3 5 The
31 It is not surprising, then, that during the Great Depression banks were more likely to fail
than other types of firms. From 1930 to 1933, 13.05% of all banks failed annually, as com-
pared with an average annual failure rate for other businesses of 1.27%. G. Benston, R.
Eisenbeis, P. Horvitz, E. Kane & G. Kaufman, Perspectives on Safe and Sound Banking 58
(1986). Between 1875 and 1929, however, banks failed at virtually the same rate as other
businesses-1.02% annually versus 1.00%. Id.; see also Rolnick & Weber, New Evidence on
the Free Banking Era, 23 Am. Econ. Rev. 1080, 1084 (1983) (surprisingly few banks failed
between 1837 and 1863, when entry into banking was unrestricted).
33 If bank failures were not widespread, there would be no reduction in the money supply.
Deposits withdrawn from one bank would simply be reinvested in another bank. For a more
complete discussion of the money supply process, see F. Mishkin, The Economics of Money,
Banking, and Financial Markets 238-319 (1986).
3 The mechanics of this phenomenon are not well understood. For a summary of the em-
pirical evidence and proposed explanations, see R. Barro, Macroeconomics 439-86 (1984). For
a more skeptical view, see Black, Noise, 41 J. Fin. 529, 536-41 (1986).
35 The role of banks in the money supply process is somewhat less important today than it
was prior to the introduction of money market mutual funds and other alternative sources of
liquidity. On the other hand, most economists continue to believe that unexpected drops in
the money supply will have adverse economic consequences. Money market funds and other
1987] 311
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economic justification for the Federal Reserve System is that it
serves as a lender of last resort and prevents the adverse economic
consequences of such sharp declines in the money supply. 6
A number of economists in recent years have emphasized an addi-
tional social cost of bank failures-the interruption of the availabil-
ity of credit in the economy to finance investment projects and the
disruption of ongoing projects when loans are called.31 But this cost
of bank failures is no different from the cost imposed by other types
of business failures. The widespread failure of steel firms, for exam-
ple, will disrupt investment projects in the economy that are depen-
dent on the domestic production of steel. Indeed, because depositors
can obtain liquidity services from nonbank alternatives,8 and be-
cause most borrowers have access to alternative sources of financing,
the "real" effects of widespread bank failures that are unrelated to a
contraction of the money supply may be smaller than the effects of
the widespread failure of nonbanking firms that provide more spe-
cialized services for which fewer close substitutes exist.
II. FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE AND THE TREATMENT OF FAILED
BANKS
Federal deposit insurance was unique among New Deal programs.
We provide an economic explanation for federal deposit insurance
that follows directly from our discussion of the economic function of
banks. We also discuss the costs of federal deposit insurance and of
de facto insurance created by governmental assistance to failed
banks. Finally, we explore the possibility of greater reliance on pri-
vate insurance markets and the bankruptcy laws.
innovations may moderate the disruptive effects but do not eliminate them altogether.
The seminal critique of the performance of the Federal Reserve as lender of last resort
during the Great Depression is M. Friedman & A. Schwartz, A Monetary History of the
United States, 1867-1960, at 299-419 (1963).
37 For articulations of this view, see Bernanke, Nonmonetary Effects of the Financial Crisis
in the Propagation of the Great Depression, 73 Am. Econ. Rev. 257 (1983); Diamond &
Dybvig, supra note 19, at 402.
To be sure, alternative providers of liquidity services may not be perfect substitutes for
the original lender, particularly if the original lender has unique information about the bor-
rower. But the magnitude of this effect should not be exaggerated. For example, information
can be transferred by moving files; alternatively, loan officers themselves can be hired by the
successor lender. Moreover, transaction-specific investments are not unique to banks but exist
in a wide variety of contexts. See Goetz & Scott, Principles of Relational Contracts, 67 Va. L.
Rev. 1089, 1100-01 (1981).
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A. The FDIC as a Solution to the Prisoner's Dilemma Faced by
Bank Depositors
Federal deposit insurance eliminates the incentive of depositors
whose claims are insured to withdraw assets from banks that are
perceived to be in financial distress. Thus, federal deposit insurance
is a solution to the problem of me-first behavior, which can lead to
the failure of a previously solvent bank."9 Deposit insurance, how-
ever, is not complete. Deposits over $100,000 are not insured, and
other debt claims are completely uninsured. The possibility re-
mains, therefore, that some bank creditors will engage in me-first
behavior notwithstanding the existence of deposit insurance.
The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) has mini-
mized this residual danger of me-first behavior by providing de
facto insurance to creditors whose claims are nominally uninsured.
The FDIC has several alternatives when dealing with a bank that
has failed or is in imminent danger of failing. It can pay off insured
depositors, provide direct financial assistance to the bank, or ar-
range a purchase-and-assumption transaction whereby the assets
and liabilities of the distressed bank are transferred to an acquiring
bank. Because the assets of the distressed bank, plus any premium
that the acquiring bank is willing to pay, are typically worth sub-
stantially less than its liabilities, purchase-and-assumption transac-
tions can only be effected with financial assistance from the FDIC.
The purchase-and-assumption transaction is by far the most com-
mon alternative chosen by the FDIC. In other cases, such as the
well-publicized episode at Continental Illinois where no acquisition
could be arranged,40 the FDIC has provided direct financial assis-
tance to keep the bank from failing. Both purchase-and-assumption
transactions and direct financial assistance to troubled banks have
the effect of creating a de facto system of insurance for all creditors.
Only rarely will the FDIC choose to pay off insured depositors and
allow the bank to fail-the celebrated case of Penn Square Bank in
Oklahoma 1 being an exception-and virtually never has the FDIC
opted for this alternative in the case of a large bank.
" Deposit insurance is a more effective solution to the lrisoner's dilemma faced by bank
depositors than the Federal Reserve acting as a lender of last resort. Action taken by the
Federal Reserve is discretionary and thus uncertain. The provision of deposit insurance, at
least up to the statutory limit, is not.
40 See Foulkes, The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation: The Rescue of Continental Illi-
nois National Bank and Trust Company, 1985 Ann. Surv. Am. L. 137.
41 See Rescigno, Why Penn Square Failed, Barron's, Aug. 23, 1982, at 6.
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B. The FDIC and the Problem of Moral Hazard
One of the well-known conflicts of interest between creditors with
fixed claims and stockholders concerns the riskiness of investment
policy. Stockholders, as residual claimants, prefer firms to pursue
high variance (risky) projects, whereas creditors generally do not.
Stockholders can therefore transfer wealth from creditors to them-
selves by pursuing risky investments.
An identical moral hazard exists when the claims of depositors are
insured, either directly by the FDIC or de facto as a result of the
treatment of failed banks. As an illustration, consider two
worlds-one where all deposits are uninsured and another where all
deposits are insured at a fixed insurance premium. In deciding
whether to make an exceptionally risky loan, the bank in the world
of uninsured deposits must consider the probability that adding the
loan to its portfolio of assets will force it to pay more to attract and
preserve deposits. In contrast, the funding costs of the bank in the
world of insured deposits and fixed insurance premiums are unaf-
fected by the risky loan. Therefore, at the margin, the bank in the
second world has an incentive to make risky loans that it would not
make but for insurance.
Another way of understanding this point is to view fixed-price de-
posit insurance as a put option that is "in the money" when the
value of a bank's assets fall below the face value of insured deposits.
One of the central principles of option pricing theory is that the
value of an option varies directly with the riskiness of the underly-
ing asset.4 2 Therefore, when the price of insurance is fixed, increas-
ing the riskiness of the loan portfolio increases the value of the de-
posit insurance/put option, which redounds primarily to the benefit
of the residual claimants-bank stockholders. 3
Of course, this moral hazard is not unique to federal deposit in-
surance; it is present in all insurance contracts. But the tools availa-
ble to minimize conflicts of interest are more limited in the banking
context. In other settings, insurers generally use such contractual
devices as deductibles, co-insurance, and risk-related premiums to
force the insured to internalize the costs of engaging in risky activi-
ties. None of these devices is currently available to the FDIC. The
42 See Black & Scholes, The Pricing of Options and Corporate Liabilities, 81 J. Pol. Econ.
637 (1973).
43 This point is analogous to the one made by Sharpe concerning the incentive effects of
pension insurance provided by the federal Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation. See
Sharpe, Corporate Pension Funding Policy, 3 J. Fin. Econ. 183, 187 (1976).
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inability to employ these contractual provisions suggests that the
FDIC will be less successful than other types of insurers in causing
their insureds to internalize the costs of risky activities.
We do not mean to suggest that banks are completely free to ex-
ternalize the costs of risky activities. Minimum capital require-
ments" and lending limits, for example, are best understood as reg-
ulatory requirements that protect the FDIC. The same is true for
reporting requirements and the ability of banking regulators to con-
duct inspections and impose sanctions, including termination of in-
surance.45 These regulatory provisions all help internalize the costs
of risky activities. But it is probable that banking regulators are less
successful than private insurers in internalizing the costs of risky
activities because of the unavailability of contractual devices
designed for this purpose and the related problem of regulators' lack
of access to information.
A trade-off exists between the goal of minimizing me-first behav-
ior and the goal of internalizing the costs of risky activities. The
more complete the insurance scheme, the lower is the probability of
me-first behavior but the greater is the incentive to engage in risky
activities. Consider the bailout of Continental. Direct government
assistance in effect extended the system of insurance to creditors
whose claims were nominally uninsured, and it sent a message to
uninsured creditors of other large banks that their claims were now
insured.4" This action reduced the probability that uninsured credi-
tors at Continental or elsewhere would engage in me-first behavior,
but it also reduced the incentive of these creditors to engage in any
monitoring. If all creditor claims are insured, creditors will invest
where they are promised the highest return regardless of risk. The
task of monitoring then falls to the FDIC. To the extent that the
FDIC is less effective in monitoring the debtor than these creditors
(or private insurers standing in their shoes), some of the cost of
risky activities is externalized. This weakening of market con-
straints on risk-taking by banks is a social cost that should be
weighed against whatever social benefits were perceived by the ar-
chitects of the Continental bailout.
4 Capital requirements are equivalent to a deductible. A "cushion" of the stockholders'
equity and subordinated debt means that the first dollars lost from bad loans are lost by the
bank rather than by the insurer.
" See 12 U.S.C. § 1818 (1982).
"6 The bailout of Continental extended beyond the bank itself to the holding company.
Thus, the FDIC provided de facto insurance to creditors of the holding company as well as of
the bank. For a discussion of the bailout, see Foulkes, supra note 40.
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It is possible to strengthen market discipline on risk-taking by
banks in a variety of ways. One method is to increase the minimum
capital requirements for banks.4 7 Alternatively, the insurance
scheme could be changed. Possible reforms of the insurance system
include having risk-related insurance premiums,'  reducing the
amount of insurance coverage (for example, through co-insurance),
eliminating de facto insurance by letting banks fail, and, as dis-
cussed in the next section, allowing private insurers to play more of
a role. These reforms appear promising, but they are not costless.
For example, the calculation of risk-related premiums would likely
require additional expenditures on information and personnel. Al-
though the benefits of these expenditures would seem to outweigh
the costs in private insurance markets, it is not clear that the same
would be true in the case of a single government agency. The other
possible reforms all increase market discipline by forcing investors
to bear more of the loss of bank failure, but they also lead to an
increase in me-first behavior, again highlighting the trade-off be-
tween minimizing this behavior and internalizing the costs of risky
activities.
C. Private Insurance as an Alternative to Federal Deposit
Insurance
The severity of the moral hazard created by the current regime of
federal deposit insurance naturally raises the issue of whether a sys-
tem of private insurance would be preferable. A system of private
insurance supplied competitively would, like federal deposit insur-
ance, minimize the prisoner's dilemma problem faced by bank de-
positors and perhaps be more successful than the current system in
forcing banks to internalize the costs of risky activities.
The question is whether a market in private insurance of bank
deposits would exist in the absence of government insurance. Re-
cent research has demonstrated that, prior to the Federal Reserve
System and the FDIC, private markets developed ingenious institu-
tional arrangements to make banks less susceptible to systemic fail-
ure.' 9 In Canada, government insurance for deposits did not exist
47 See Black, Miller & Posner, An Approach to the Regulation of Bank Holding Companies,
51 J. Bus. 379, 402-05 (1978).
48 See Scott & Mayer, Risk and Regulation in Banking: Some Proposals for Federal Deposit
Insurance Reform, 23 Stan. L. Rev. 857, 886-95 (1971).
41 See, e.g., Gorton, Private Clearinghouses and the Origin of Central Banking in the
United States, 45 J. Econ. Hist. 277 (1985).
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until 1968 and was then initiated in response to the failure of a
small bank rather than systemic failures.
Whether private insurance of deposits or other institutional ar-
rangements would be a perfect substitute for government insurance
is another question. Because the causes of bank failures may be
highly correlated (i.e., a general economic or industry-wide down-
turn), a private insurance market of bank deposits might not sur-
vive. Yet the development of a private mortgage insurance market,
which is susceptible to this same problem, suggests that private in-
surance of bank deposits could exist. Nevertheless, private insurers
would face a solvency risk in the event of economic downturn or
industry collapse that does not exist for the FDIC, which is in effect
backed by the full faith and credit of the United StatesY° This sol-
vency risk could be minimized, however, by a reinsurance market, or
eliminated altogether if the government acted as reinsurer of ap-
proved private insurers.
It is also important to recognize that banks themselves might be
different in a world of private deposit insurance. Contracts with de-
positors, debt-equity ratios, and asset-liability mixes might all look
different in an unregulated banking market. In addition, as we dis-
cuss below, 1 it is unlikely that many of the activity and geographic
restrictions banks currently face would exist in a banking market
without federal insurance.
D. The Bankruptcy Laws and the Prisoner's Dilemma
Deposit insurance, whether public or private, is not the only pos-
sible solution to the problem of me-first behavior-a problem that
is not unique to banking, as discussed above.52 In other contexts, the
problem is addressed by the bankruptcy laws.5" Bankruptcy has a
number of mechanisms for dealing with the prisoner's dilemma
faced by creditors of an insolvent firm. The automatic stay after the
filing of the bankruptcy petition,54 for example, prevents individual
creditors from withdrawing assets from the firm to the possible det-
8 A similar problem of who will insure the insurer also suggests that private insurance may
not be a perfect substitute for the corporate law doctrine of limited liability. For a discussion,
see Easterbrook & Fischel, Limited Liability and the Corporation, 52 U. Chi. L. Rev. 89, 101-
03 (1985).
5' See infra text accompanying notes 58-97.
" See supra text accompanying note 20.
AS See D. Baird & T. Jackson, Cases, Problems, and Materials on Bankruptcy 31-34 (1985).
See 11 U.S.C. § 362 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
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riment of the creditors as a group. Similarly, preference law55 con-
trols me-first behavior prior to the filing for bankruptcy by elimi-
nating any advantage that individual creditors might gain by taking
action just in advance of the bankruptcy proceeding. Taken to-
gether, preference law and the automatic stay are designed to mini-
mize the incentive of individual creditors to pursue behavior that
maximizes their own wealth while reducing that of creditors as a
group.
Thus the economic functions of bankruptcy laws and federal de-
posit insurance are very similar. Both address the same economic
problem of the prisoner's dilemma. The primary difference is that
the thrust of bankruptcy laws is to ensure that creditors of the same
class are treated equally, whereas federal deposit insurance ensures
that certain classes of creditors are paid in full.
The similarity between the bankruptcy laws and federal deposit
insurance calls into question the need for two systems. Why, in
other words, are banks specifically exempted from the bankruptcy
laws? 56 One reason is that the traditional function of banks is pro-
viding liquidity. The bankruptcy process necessitates a suspension
of certain contractual rights. Short-term creditors, for example, may
have their assets tied up for long periods of time during the bank-
ruptcy process. This delay in the ability to obtain access to funds
has historically been thought to be intolerable in the case of deposi-
tors.57 Whatever the merits of this view in the past, its validity is
questionable today because depositors have available liquidity sub-
stitutes such as money market funds and credit cards. Even if there
is still some basis for the traditional view-perhaps because the al-
ternatives are not perfect substitutes for bank deposits-it certainly
does not justify providing de facto insurance to all depositors, no
matter how large. A preferable system might be to insure small de-
positors while allowing the bankruptcy laws to operate for larger
creditors.
15 See id. § 547.
"6 See 11 U.S.C. § 109(b)(2) (1982). Although banks are exempted from the bankruptcy
laws, several provisions of the National Bank Act address the problem of bankruptcy. See 12
U.S.C. § 91 (1982) (invalidating all transfers of a bank's assets made in contemplation of
insolvency or made after an act of insolvency with the intent of preferring one creditor over
another); id. § 194 (providing for ratable distribution of liquidated bank's assets to creditors,
with the remainder being paid to stockholders).
57 There is a related point concerning administrative costs. A trustee in bankruptcy has
broad powers to recover assets paid out by the debtor immediately prior to the bankruptcy
proceeding. It may simply be too costly to have such a system for banks with many small
depositors.
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III. ACTIVITY RESTRICTIONS, RISK, AND CROSS-SUBSIDIES
The Glass-Steagall Act and the Bank Holding Company Act pro-
hibit banks and their affiliates from engaging in certain securities
activities such as underwriting,58 from selling insurance, 59 and gen-
erally from participating in "nonbanking" activities. We analyze
whether these activity restrictions reduce the risk of bank failure
and thus the exposure of the FDIC. We demonstrate that allowing
banks to engage in nonbanking activities probably would not in-
crease the risk of bank failure, and almost certainly would not do so
if banks conducted these activities through separately capitalized
nonbanking subsidiaries. We further demonstrate that the so-called
"subtle hazards" widely believed to exist in connection with com-
mercial banking activity are illusory.
A. Do Activity Restrictions Decrease the Risk of Bank Failure?
The claim that activity restrictions reduce the risk of bank failure
rests in large part on two related assumptions: (1) that traditional
banking activities are safe, and (2) that diversifying into activities
not "properly incident to banking" makes banks less safe. Neither
of these assumptions is supported by economic theory and evidence.
1. Are Traditional Banking Activities Necessarily "Safe"?
A loan by a bank is a form of investment decision. It would be
possible for a bank to make its investments virtually riskless, by
purchasing only short-term obligations of the United States. But
the distinctive economic function of banks, as compared with cer-
tain other types of financial intermediaries, is to extend credit to
borrowers engaged in risky projects. Once this economic function of
banks is understood, it is clear that traditional banking activities
cannot be inherently safe. Indeed, recent events contradict the as-
sumption that traditional banking activities are somehow "safe."
There has been a dramatic rise in the number of bank failures and
near-failures in recent years.6 0 The direct causes of these banking
problems include nonperforming energy loans, real estate loans, and
loans to less developed countries. Even performing loans, such as
long-term fixed-rate mortgage loans, can be extremely risky during
" See 12 U.S.C. § 377 (1982).
" See 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8) (1982).
60 See Short, FDIC Settlement Practices and the Size of Failed Banks, Econ. Rev. (Fed.
Reserve Bank of Dallas), Mar. 1985, at 12.
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a period of rapidly rising nominal interest rates, as financial institu-
tions learned in the late 1970's. This interest rate risk, like the de-
fault risk created by nonperforming loans, belies any notion that
traditional banking activities are inherently safe.
It is also important to emphasize that virtually no bank failure
has ever been attributed to the activities of holding company sub-
sidiaries or to the "nonbanking" activities of banks, such as broker-
age activities or the underwriting of general obligation municipal
bonds. 1 For example, BankAmerica's much-discussed problems de-
rive from loan losses and have nothing to do with the activities of
Charles Schwab & Co., its formerly affiliated (recently divested) re-
tail discount brokerage firm.62 The frequent argument that recent
bank failures and near-failures demonstrate the danger of combin-
ing banking and nonbanking activities thus appears to be contra-
dicted by the evidence.
2. Does the Risk of Bank Failure Increase when Banks Engage in
Nonbanking Activities?
Modern portfolio theory demonstrates that the riskiness of a par-
ticular asset cannot be evaluated in isolation-the relationship be-
tween the riskiness of the particular asset and that of other assets
must also be considered. By holding a portfolio of securities, an in-
vestor can achieve a given expected rate of return at less total risk
than if he held a single security with the same expected return.
Some of the risk of the individual security is eliminated by diversifi-
cation. Analogously, in assessing whether nonbanking activities
would make banks riskier, it is necessary to consider the covariance
of a proposed activity in combination with existing banking activity.
The lower the covariance between different types of activi-
ties-meaning that when one type of activity does well, the odds are
that the other does poorly-the more likely it is that total bank risk
can be reduced by diversification.
The empirical evidence to date suggests that combining banking
and nonbanking activities may reduce the overall riskiness of bank
assets.63 Several studies have demonstrated that bank assets have
61 See Saunders, Bank Safety and Soundness and the Risks of Corporate Securities Activi-
ties, in Deregulating Wall Street: Commercial Bank Penetration of the Corporate Securities
Market 171, 180-81 (I. Walter ed. 1985).
'2 See Huge Loss Posted by BankAmerica, N.Y. Times, July 17, 1986, at Al, col. 5 ($640
million loss in the second quarter of 1986 due primarily to energy and real estate loans).
63 See Eisemann, Diversification and the Congeneric Bank Holding Company, 7 J. Bank
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been of about average riskiness when compared with other indus-
tries over relatively long periods of time, and that profits in several
industries were negatively correlated with banking profits. These
studies indicate that there are unexploited opportunities for reduc-
ing the risk of banks' assets by combining banking with nonbanking
activities.
Whether the risk of bank failure will be increased by nonbanking
activities is also affected by how the new activities are financed. If
the additional activities are financed by claims that are junior to
those of existing creditors, expansion into nonbanking activities will
necessarily make existing creditors, including depositors, safer be-
cause their claims will be protected by a greater cushion of subordi-
nated debt and equity.64 Such financing will also decrease the expo-
sure of the FDIC, regardless of the riskiness of new activities.
B. The FDIC as Monitor
Federal deposit insurance creates an incentive for banks to engage
in risky activities because some of the costs of failure are shifted to
the FDIC.e5 The riskier the activity, the more valuable the insur-
ance. To minimize this incentive, the FDIC monitors the activities
of banks. One argument for restricting the activities of banks to
traditional lending activities is that the FDIC can monitor this ac-
tivity at lower cost than it could other activities. It seems plausible
to assume, for example, that the personnel of the FDIC are better
able to monitor the prudence of commercial loans than, say, of oil
drilling.
Although this argument is not without merit, its force should not
be exaggerated. There is no obvious relationship between the list of
permissible activities and the monitoring costs incurred by the
FDIC. For example, banks currently are permitted to underwrite
general revenue bonds, lend to less developed countries, trade for-
eign currencies, and underwrite corporate securities in foreign coun-
tries. At the same time, they are prohibited from offering open-end
Res. 68 (1976); Eisenbeis & Wall, Bank Holding Company Nonbanking Activities and Risk, in
Fed. Reserve Bank of Chicago, Bank Structure and Competition 340 (1984); Heggestad, Riski-
ness of Investments in Nonbank Activities by Bank Holding Companies, 27 J. Econ. & Bus.
219 (1975); Johnson & Meinster, Bank Holding Companies: Diversification Opportunities in
Nonbank Activities, 1 E. Econ. J. 316 (1974).
" For a general demonstration of this point, see Fama, The Effects of a Firm's Investment
and Financing Decisions on the Welfare of Its Security Holders, 68 Am. Econ. Rev. 272
(1978).
65 See supra text accompanying notes 42-48.
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mutual funds66 and underwriting high-grade third-party commercial
paper.6 7 It is implausible that the permitted activities are less risky
or easier to monitor than the prohibited activities. If anything, the
opposite appears to be true.
Moreover, the ability to monitor loans effectively for a particular
activity cannot be completely divorced from knowledge of the un-
derlying activity itself. Monitoring loans to oil drillers requires
knowledge of oil drilling. Because banks lend in a large number of
industries, the ability of the FDIC to monitor effectively is ques-
tionable in any event." Put differently, the incremental effect on
the FDIC's monitoring ability of allowing banks to diversify is likely
to be slight.
C. The Alternative of Structural Separation
Our analysis, though not unambiguous, suggests that eliminating
activity restrictions would not increase the risk of bank failure and
would not significantly increase the monitoring costs of the FDIC.
This conclusion can be reached with even greater confidence if it is
assumed that nonbanking activities would be carried out in struc-
turally distinct, separately capitalized subsidiaries.6 9 If such a non-
banking subsidiary failed, its creditors would have no claim on the
assets of the related bank or parent. This result is a direct implica-
tion of the basic (and efficient) corporation law principle that credi-
tors of a subsidiary corporation-especially contractual creditors, as
distinguished from involuntary tort creditors-cannot pierce the
corporate veil.70
But structural separation has costs of its own. One type of cost is
opportunity cost. Structural separation would prevent banks from
realizing the benefits of diversification:71 banks would be unable to
decrease their risk of failure by combining traditional banking activ-
ities with nontraditional activities. Moreover, any efficiencies that
See Investment Co. Inst. v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617 (1971).
' See Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 468 U.S. 137
(1984).
Analogously, bond covenants typically do not restrict a firm's investment decisions but
rather constrain its dividend and new financing policy. See Smith & Warner, On Financial
Contracting: An Analysis of Bond Covenants, 7 J. Fin. Econ. 117 (1979).
" Robert Clark has argued in favor of allowing separate affiliates to engage in multiple
lines of business. See Clark, Financial Holding Companies, supra note 15, at 787, 814-49.
70 See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 50, at 111; Posner, The Rights of Creditors of
Affiliated Corporations, 43 U. Chi. L. Rev. 499 (1976).
7'1 See supra text accompanying note 63.
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might flow from allowing banks to perform activities now forbidden
to them are likely to be greatest if (and would perhaps be achievable
only if) the activity is conducted within the bank. A commercial
bank may be a particularly efficient provider of many investment
and financial services only because of production complementarities
permitting the bank to utilize more efficiently its physical assets,
employees, and reputation capital. The most efficient method for
operating a closed-end mutual fund, for example, may be for the
fund to be managed by the bank's trust department and marketed
by bank employees who routinely provide investment advice to the
bank's existing customers. Mandating that nontraditional banking
activities be performed through a structurally separate subsidiary
may result in an uneconomical duplication of costs or an un-
economical decision not to offer the product or service at all . 2
D. Promotion, "Disinterested" Banks, and the "Subtle Hazards"
of Commercial Banking Activity
The Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized the "subtle
hazards that arise when a commercial bank goes beyond the busi-
ness of acting as fiduciary or managing agent and enters the invest-
ment banking business. ' 73 Others have made the same claim in de-
fending activity restrictions generally.74 Four possible "subtle
71 Interestingly, most of the investment banking activity undertaken by commercial banks
before the Depression appears to have been conducted in separate subsidiaries. This suggests
that not all the benefits from permitting commercial banks to engage in investment banking
activities would be lost by requiring such activities to be performed in a separate subsidiary,
although we are unsure how complete the separation between commercial banking and invest-
ment banking was prior to the Glass-Steagall Act. We suspect (and hope to confirm in a later
article) that bank losses and failures during the late 1920's and early 1930's were unrelated to
the presence or absence of investment banking affiliates.
71 Investment Co. Inst. v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617, 630 (1971). In this case the Court held that
banks cannot offer open-end mutual funds, in part because this activity presents the "subtle
hazards" Congress sought to prevent through the Glass-Steagell Act. See also Securities In-
dus. Ass'n v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 468 U.S. 137 (1984) (Glass-Steagall
Act prohibits banks from underwriting third-party commercial paper, in part because of "sub-
tle hazards"). But see Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys.,
468 U.S. 207, 220-21 (1984) ("subtle hazards" are absent when a bank affiliate engages in
retail securities brokerage); Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. v. Investment Co.
Inst., 450 U.S. 46, 64-68 (1981) ("subtle hazards" are absent when a bank or bank affiliate
acts as an investment advisor to a closed-end mutual fund). We argue that the distinctions
drawn by the Supreme Court, as well as the concept of "subtle hazards" itself, are contrary to
economic theory.
7' See authorities cited supra note 14. The "subtle hazards" justification for activity restric-
tions is obviously related to the claim that allowing banks and their affiliates to engage in new
lines of business will increase the probability of bank failure. Avoidance of "subtle hazards,"
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hazards" have been identified: (1) biased advice to cli-
ents-providing misleading information to clients of the bank to in-
duce them to purchase nonbanking services from the bank or its
affiliate; (2) uneconomical transfers-the making of loans by a bank
to a commonly controlled, financially troubled nonbanking affiliate
at less than the market rate of interest; a bank trust department
paying more than the market price for securities of an underwriting
sponsored by a commonly controlled separate underwriting subsidi-
ary; the making of loans to purchasers of these securities to ensure
that the underwriting will be successful;7 5 (3) predation-extending
credit to an affiliate at less than the market rate of interest in order
to injure rivals of the affiliate; and (4) tie-in sales-requiring cus-
tomers of the bank to purchase goods and services from commonly
controlled nonbanking business affiliates as a condition of obtaining
credit from the bank. We demonstrate below the economic fallacies
underlying the concerns that banks will engage in these practices if
activity restrictions are relaxed.
1. Biased Investment Advice
One of the claimed hazards of allowing banks and their affiliates
to enter new lines of business is that "promotional pressures" would
create a "salesman's interest" and "impair [a bank's] ability to func-
tion as an impartial source of credit. 7 The concern is that the re-
laxation of activity restrictions would cause commercial bankers to
become "promoters" rather than "bankers" and that, as a result,
they would be unable to provide disinterested investment counsel to
their customers. This concern is completely at odds with economic
theory.
Virtually all firms-and certainly all financial service firms, in-
cluding investment banks-provide information as well as products
and services. Businesses and individuals routinely turn to invest-
ment bankers, fund managers, accountants, lawyers, and the like for
investment and financial advice. There is nothing special in the fi-
nancial counsel offered by banks. That banks could conceivably of-
fer their customers misleading investment advice that could, at least
in the short run, be profitable to the bank does not distinguish
however, also appears to be an independent justification for activity restrictions.
75 Although these uneconomic transfers are referred to as "conflicts of interest" in the
banking literature, they are termed "cross-subsidies" in the literature on the pervasively regu-
lated utility industries.
7' Investment Co. Inst. v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617, 630-31 (1971).
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banks from any other provider of information.
The corporate department of a law firm, for example, could delib-
erately provide poor advice to a corporate client to increase the like-
lihood that the client will, as a consequence, require the services of
the firm's litigation department. A group medical practice could re-
fuse to inform patients of a simple preventive measure in the hope
of eventually increasing the group's surgical business. A bank, even
without entering any new lines of business, can engage in the same
types of practices. It can, for example, encourage customers to ac-
quire assets at inflated prices in the hope that the customers will
borrow more money from the bank as a result. The incentive to be a
"promoter" rather than an impartial provider of information is not
unique to banks or their affiliates engaging in securities or insurance
activities or otherwise entering new lines of business.
The incentive to provide misleading information is minimized be-
cause a firm's reputation is a critical asset that controls the firm's
long-term viability and business prospects. A firm that manipulates
and injures its customers or clients in an attempt to increase the
firm's income will quickly find itself with sharply reduced sales. The
same is true of banks-a bank that manipulates customers by offer-
ing poor investment services or financial advice in an effort to en-
rich itself and its affiliates may well be driven out of the market by
banks offering superior performance and service. A bank's incentive
to maintain its reputation is in no way dependent on whether the
bank or its affiliates engage in nonbanking activities.
Finally, a strong argument can be made that the advice provided
by banks would be more, not less, disinterested if banks and their
affiliates could offer other financial products. For example, because
banks cannot offer many types of investments, they have an incen-
tive to promote debt financing instead of a mix of debt and equity
financing. Consider as an analogy a rule prohibiting law firms from
offering services to both partnerships and corporations. One class of
law firm would market and promote the partnership form, while
others would market and promote the corporate form. Although cli-
ents would not necessarily make the wrong choice, the cost of mak-
ing the correct choice would increase-visits to both types of law
firms might be required. These costs could be avoided if businesses
could turn to a single law firm for "disinterested" counsel regarding
the choice between corporate and partnership organization. The
same would be true if customers could turn to a single financial firm
for "disinterested" advice concerning different financial products.
Indeed, the growth in high-yield debt financing by investment
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banks illustrates just this type of mixed financing counsel from a
single funds source.
2. Uneconomical Transfers
If a nonbanking subsidiary of a bank holding company is losing
money, a decision must be made whether to support that business,
in the hope that its fortunes will improve, or to abandon it. This
calculus, which is recurrently required of many businesses, is unaf-
fected by the presence of an affiliated bank. No incentive exists for
the bank to "subsidize" its financially troubled affiliate by ex-
tending credit at below the market rate of interest. It is important
to recognize that the profits of banks are not constrained by regula-
tion to any particular level-banks are not subject to rate-of-return
regulation. Consequently, there is no incentive for a bank to shift
profits to an unregulated affiliate." An example illustrates the lack
of incentive for a bank to cross-subsidize an affiliate.
If the "troubled" affiliate can obtain debt financing at arm's
length from an independent bank at an annual interest rate of, say,
fifteen percent, that cost of credit reflects an independent and real-
istic assessment of the risks attendant to the loan. A related bank
has no incentive to lend at less than fifteen percent. The bank could
have made a loan to a third party of identical risk at fifteen percent.
The difference between fifteen percent and the lower rate charged
the affiliate (say, ten percent) is the opportunity cost of transferring
credit at less than the market rate. The forgone interest (five per-
cent in this case) represents an income stream the bank could have
realized and, consequently, is a cost of the below-market loan to the
affiliate. The total cost of credit to the holding company is the cost
the affiliate pays (ten percent) plus the lost earnings of the bank
(five percent), which is equal to the cost of borrowing in the market
(fifteen percent). Put simply, although a troubled business might
appear to pay less than market rate for its loan, the related bank
suffers a corresponding loss in income. The firm as a whole cannot
reduce the cost of borrowing by charging an uneconomical transfer
price.7 8 Thus, the fear of cross-subsidization is groundless because
7 Obviously, if loans between affiliates are made at the market rate of interest (i.e., at the
same rate an independent third-party bank would charge the troubled affiliate), no cross-
subsidy or conflict of interest occurs. Indeed, such loans may illustrate efficiencies wherein
transaction costs are less for an intrafirm transfer than an arm's-length transaction.
7'8 See Hirshleifer, On the Economics of Transfer Pricing, 29 J. Bus. 172 (1956).
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nothing can be gained by causing a below-market transfer of credit
from the bank to a troubled affiliate.
The concept of opportunity cost likewise demonstrates the fallacy
of the argument that banks would make loans at below-market rates
to purchasers of securities from a related underwriter or would
purchase the securities themselves at prices in excess of the market
price. Such decisions would simply transfer a loss from the under-
writer to the bank but would do nothing to reduce the size of the
loss itself. The bank would therefore have no incentive to engage in
these practices.
3. Predation
It is sometimes alleged that allowing bank holding companies to
own businesses unrelated to banking would cause the holding com-
pany, through predatory or exclusionary practices, to drive rivals
from markets in which its nonbanking subsidiaries compete, in an
effort to obtain a monopoly position. This argument proceeds on the
unstated assumption that predatory pricing and related prac-
tices-all of which, if successful, violate the antitrust laws-are
made less costly because the subsidiary has access to funds supplied
by an affiliated bank.
It must be emphasized that the scholarly legal and economic liter-
ature demonstrates that attempted predation is extremely rare, and
successful predation even rarer still.79 A fear of predation is war-
ranted only when the likelihood of "recoupment" is great, that is,
only when it is probable that a firm that has driven competitors
from the market will be able to charge a price sufficiently above the
competitive level to generate profits that more than offset losses
suffered during the period of predation. If the firm cannot recoup
its losses, predation is senseless; and recoupment is unlikely when
competitors can enter or reenter the market at low cost. Thus, pre-
dation is unlikely to be profitable, regardless of the source of funds
or the market in which it is attempted.
But even if predation were a matter of general concern and were
not adequately deterred by the antitrust laws, allowing bank hold-
ing companies to own businesses unrelated to banking would not
increase the likelihood of successful predation because access to a
bank does not lower the cost of predation. Funds used to support
71 See, e.g., McGee, Predatory Price Cutting: The Standard Oil (N.J.) Case, 1 J.L. & Econ.
137 (1958).
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predatory pricing need not derive from bank loans-a firm desiring
to sell below cost can use any source of funds and, most impor-
tantly, the cost to a predator of selling below cost is the same re-
gardless of the source of funds. This is merely another implication
of the fact that the opportunity costs to an integrated bank holding
company include any interest income forgone as a result of making
below-market loans.
Nor does the existence of federal deposit insurance increase the
likelihood that a bank would finance an affiliate's attempted preda-
tion. It is sometimes claimed that it is "unfair" to allow banks or
their affiliates to compete in nonbanking activities. The stated rea-
son is typically that banks receive a subsidy from the FDIC that
gives them an unfair advantage over firms in unrelated lines of busi-
nesses. This claim is false.
First, it is inaccurate to assert that federal deposit insurance nec-
essarily "subsidizes" or otherwise benefits all insured institutions.
The federal deposit insurance system is backed by government
guarantees and, to this extent, insured banks as a group do receive a
government subsidy. The deposit insurance system, however, is
designed to be self-financing-payments from the-fund are meant to
be financed from the premiums paid in. Yet because FDIC premi-
ums are not risk-related, riskier banks pay less than they would in a
regime that tied premiums to risk, while safer banks pay more.
Under the existing deposit insurance system, therefore, it is unclear
whether safe banks receive a net subsidy. They benefit from the
government guarantee of the deposit insurance system, but they pay
insurance premiums that subsidize risky banks.
Second, even if the existence of a subsidy is presumed, claims of
"unfairness" are still misguided. Admittedly, because of the moral
hazard problem discussed above,80 federal deposit insurance may
make banks more likely to finance risky projects. Predation is surely
a highly risky venture, and therefore at the margin deposit insur-
ance theoretically could increase the frequency of attempted preda-
tion by bank holding companies. But whatever the effects of deposit
insurance, the cost of financing an affiliate in predation or any other
venture is the opportunity cost of those funds-the rate that could
be earned on an investment (loan) of comparable risk. Regardless of
whether a bank enjoys federal deposit insurance, it has no more in-
80 See supra text accompanying notes 42-48.
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centive to finance an affiliate's attempted predation than would a
third-party lender.
4. Tie-In Sales
A final concern that sometimes is expressed is a fear of anticom-
petitive tie-ins. The concern is that if bank holding companies were
permitted to expand the scope of their activities, and if the anti-
trust laws provide insufficient deterrence, banks might engage in ef-
forts to tie the purchase of affiliates' products or services to the
purchase of credit, checking, or other banking services. Standard ec-
onomic analysis suggests that this concern is unwarranted.
The economic literature on tie-ons is extensive,81 and we make no
attempt to summarize it here. It is sufficient for our purposes to
note that anticompetitive tie-in sales can only occur under ex-
tremely limited circumstances. For example, it is possible for a firm
with substantial market power to use tie-in sales to take advantage
of complementarities in demand and thereby enhance its market
power . 2 The best example is a monopolist's use of a tie-in to dis-
criminate in price-to charge a higher price to those with intensive
(inelastic) demands than to those who have better substitutes (more
elastic demands) for the tying product.
It is highly unlikely that banks have market power over the avail-
ability of credit or in the provision of other banking services. It is
also unlikely that significant complementarities in demand exist be-
tween banking and nonbanking activities. The proliferation of sub-
stitutes for virtually all products offered by banks and the increas-
ingly national and even international nature of credit markets
suggest that the probability that banks have market power is re-
mote. Similarly, it is doubtful whether the demand for banking ser-
vices of any type would be closely related to the demand for the
products or services of nonbanking affiliates. There is simply no
reason, for example, to believe that the demand for underwriting
services or kitchen appliances is a good proxy for the intensity of
demand for bank credit. It is much more likely that the demands
for different types of banking services would be closely related, but
this problem (or more likely, nonproblem) already exists under cur-
rent law.
In sum, neither the prevention-of-bank-failures rationale nor the
"subtle hazards" rationale provide a plausible justification for activ-
81 See, e.g., R. Posner, Antitrust Law: An Economic Perspective 171-84 (1976).
'2 See id. at 173.
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ity restrictions. These restrictions are best understood as anticom-
petitive restraints that protect existing firms in particular lines of
business. Thus, it is not surprising that securities firms consistently
lobby and file suits to prevent commercial banks from entering new
lines of business, while commercial banks and other financial firms
do the same to prevent diversified firms from operating banks. The
important point, however, is that activity restrictions in their cur-
rent form are completely unrelated to the characteristics of banks
that make them different from other types of firms.
IV. ENTRY CONTROLS, GEOGRAPHIC RESTRICTIONS, AND THE DuAL
BANKING SYSTEM
In this section, we demonstrate that chartering requirements and
restrictions on geographic expansion, like activity restrictions, are
best understood as restraints on competition that have nothing to
do with the reasons why banks are different from other types of
firms. We also show that the dual banking system, which could po-
tentially mitigate the anticompetitive effects of entry controls and
geographic restrictions, has not had this effect.
A. Entry Restrictions
Banks must obtain a charter from either state or federal regula-
tory authorities in order to operate. If there were no system of fed-
eral deposit insurance, the only theoretical justification for entry
controls would be to protect depositors from investing in unsafe
banks. A related argument would be that certification in the form of
chartering enables depositors to reduce the search costs associated
with deciding in which bank to place their funds.8 3
With the advent of federal deposit insurance, emphasis shifts
from protecting depositors to protecting the insurer. Here, again, a
case can be made for entry controls, particularly because the premi-
ums charged for deposit insurance as currently structured are not
risk-related. Thus, regulators could rationally refuse to grant a char-
ter to a bank that had a greater than average chance of falling.
The problem with this argument is that it ignores the way entry
controls have in fact been implemented. The reality of entry con-
trols is that they have been applied capriciously depending on the
philosophy of the particular regulator.8' To the extent that a pat-
83 This argument is similar to the economic argument in favor of licensing physicians.
See Scott, In Quest of Reason: The Licensing Decisions of the Federal Banking Agencies,
330 [Vol. 73:301
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tern exists, entry controls appear to have been used for the purpose
of limiting competition rather than promoting safety. "Insufficient
need in the community to be served" is a far more common justifi-
cation for denying charter applications than "inadequate capital,"
although it is only in the latter case that entry controls might argua-
bly protect potential depositors and insurers from unsafe banks.8 5 In
the same vein, the typical objectors to new charter applications are
existing competitors, who obviously have strong incentives to claim
that there is "insufficient need" for another bank."8
B. Restrictions on Geographic Expansion
Many state laws limit the ability of state-chartered banks to es-
tablish branches in that state. The McFadden Act makes these
state-law restrictions on branching applicable to national banks lo-
cated within the particular state.8 7 Moreover, the Douglas Amend-
ment to the Bank Holding Company Act prohibits holding compa-
nies from expanding across state lines unless expressly permitted to
do so by state law.88 Although these restrictions appear to be gar-
den-variety special interest legislation designed to protect existing
banks from competition, they are sometimes justified as necessary
to prevent undue concentration in the banking system. This justifi-
cation rests on three premises: (1) that relaxing geographic restric-
tions would increase concentration; (2) that an increase in concen-
tration would be harmful, even if it would not constitute a violation
of the antitrust laws; and (3) that geographic restrictions are the
most efficient method for deterring harmful concentration. We ex-
amine these premises below.
42 U. Chi. L. Rev. 235, 288 (1975).
"' See Shull & Horvitz, Branch Banking and the Structure of Competition, 1 Nat'l Banking
Rev. 301 (1964) (in a study of reasons given for rejecting applications for new national banks
and branches, insufficient need was given as a justification approximately seven times more
frequently than inadequate capital).
8 Several studies have concluded that for long periods of time federal entry controls were
effective in restricting new entry. From 1936 to 1962, the number of new banks was approxi-
mately 25% to 50% lower than it would have been if entry had been unrestricted. See Ed-
wards & Edwards, Measuring the Effectiveness of Regulation: The Case of Bank Entry Regu-
lation, 17 J.L. & Econ. 445 (1974); Peltzman, Entry in Commercial Banking, 8 J.L. & Econ.
11, 48 (1965). Entry barriers were loosened between 1962 and 1966 but were again toughened
after 1966. See Ginsburg, Interstate Banking, 9 Hofstra L. Rev. 1133, 1144 n.31 (1981).
87 See 12 U.S.C. § 36(c) (1982).
See id. § 1842(d).
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1. Geographic Restrictions and Concentration
Relaxing geographic restrictions would have the greatest impact
on concentration if there were significant economies of scale in
banking. The studies that have focused on this issue have concluded
that such scale economies, if any, appear to be small. 9 For example,
two recent econometric studies conclude that, although there may
be economies of scale at very low levels of output, these economies
are exhausted as bank size expands beyond the quite modest figure
of $25 million (in dollars of the late 1970's).90
The difficulty with these studies is that they appear to fly in the
face of experience. In particular, they cannot explain why, in states
where branch banking is unrestricted, it apparently becomes the
dominant form of bank organization.9 1 The inability of the
econometric studies to account for this empirical fact may be attrib-
utable to the methodology of the research: the studies focus exclu-
sively on operating costs and ignore other possible sources of econo-
mies. For example, the studies do not consider the economies of
branching that result from consumers being able to deal conve-
niently with a single bank regardless of where they are in a given
state.
Experience suggests, then, that scale economies probably do exist
in banking, and they are most likely greater than the existing
econometric studies indicate. We doubt, however, that the scale
economies are vast. In recent years a number of states have relaxed
unit banking laws, and the subsequent developments in market
structure are instructive. For example, in 1971 New York liberalized
the conditions under which New York City banks could establish
branches upstate, and at that time a number of the money center
banks attempted to expand into upstate metropolitan areas. Ap-
proximately ten years later, the combined market share of the New
York City banks in the upstate areas was only about ten percent.92
s For a summary of the literature, see Gilbert, Bank Market Structure and Competition: A
Survey, 16 J. Money, Credit & Banking 617, 636-43 (1984).
"See Benston, Hanweck & Humphrey, Scale Economies in Banking: A Restructuring and
Reassessment, 14 J. Money, Credit and Banking 435, 451 (1982); Gilligan, Smirlock & Mar-
shall, Scale and Scope Economies in the Multi-Product Banking Firm, 13 J. Monetary Econ.
393, 401-03 (1984). Gilligan, et al. do find statistical evidence of economies of scope. Although
their results indicate diseconomies if the scale of banking is increased beyond relatively low
levels, the results also suggest that it is more efficient to combine the acceptance of deposits
and the making of loans into one operation. See id.
91 See Peltzman, Comment, 16 J. Money, Credit & Banking 650, 651 (1984).
2 King, Upstate New York: Tough Markets for City Banks, 70 Econ. Rev. (Fed. Reserve
[Vol. 73:301
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Similar results have been found in studies of banks acquired by
large bank holding companies. After the acquisitions, there appear
to be no signs of the acquired banks dramatically increasing their
market shares, contrary to what might be expected if the acquisi-
tions realized significant economies of scale."
Finally, we note that even if there are significant economies of
scale in banking, it is still not obvious that relaxing existing geo-
graphic restrictions would have much incremental effect on market
structure. The fact that bank holding companies and local banks are
expending substantial resources lobbying for and against interstate
banking proposals convinces us that there would be some incremen-
tal effect. Why else spend the money? Nevertheless, we would not
expect this incremental effect to be large. First, in states that allow
branch banking, most of the available economies may already have
been exhausted by intrastate expansion. Second, in many ways in-
terstate banking already is a reality. We currently observe interstate
banking by mail, interstate solicitation of commercial borrowers, in-
terstate bank chains linked by common ownership but not held in
holding company form, and other forms of de facto interstate bank-
ing. Therefore, even if economies of scale in banking are significant,
we question whether officially sanctioning interstate banking would
have much incremental effect on bank market structure.
2. Concentration and Consumer Welfare
Economists are concerned about concentration only to the extent
that the ability of firms to charge supracompetitive prices is in-
creased. Size per se is not a concern. Thus, even if we assume that
the relaxation of geographic restrictions will lead to a marked in-
crease in concentration, the relevant question is whether such an
increase would adversely affect consumers.
A number of economists have studied the relationship between
market concentration and bank performance." Performance has
been measured in a variety of ways-return on assets, return on eq-
Bank of Atlanta), June-July 1985, at 30, 33.
13 King, The Impact of Local Market Entry by Large Bank Holding Companies, 67 Econ.
Rev. (Fed. Reserve Bank of Atlanta), Nov. 1982, at 41. For an overview of the studies of
competition between large and small banks, see Rhoades, The Implications for Bank Merger
Policy of Financial Deregulation, Interstate Banking, and Financial Supermarkets, at 8 (Fed.
Reserve Bd. Staff Study No. 137) (1984) (small banks, whether specialized or diversified, are
likely to remain viable institutions).
" See Gilbert, supra note 89, at 618-36 (reviewing 45 such studies conducted between 1964
and 1983).
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uity, average interest rates, average deposit service charges-and re-
searchers have attempted to control for the influence of other vari-
ables, besides concentration, on bank performance. The great
majority of these studies conclude that, all else being equal, profits,
interest rates, and service charges are somewhat higher where local
banking markets are most highly concentrated.
It is extremely difficult, however, to draw meaningful conclusions
from these studies. First, many of them have serious methodological
problems. For example, using profits as a measure of performance
creates a difficulty because it is unclear whether high profits reflect
supracompetitive pricing or superior efficiency.9 5 Measuring interest
rates is also problematic. If interest rates have been changing over
time, average interest rates will depend on the age composition of
the outstanding loans and may therefore be a poor measure of cur-
rent market rates.
Second, and more important for our purposes, concentration in
banking has historically been a function of regulatory barriers to en-
try that have benefited banks while harming borrowers and deposi-
tors. Therefore, if anything, the research on concentration in bank-
ing provides empirical support for the general economic
presumption in favor of unrestricted entry.96 If entry barriers are
removed, economic theory suggests that the surviving firms will do a
better job of serving consumers, regardless of whether a particular
market becomes more or less concentrated.
97
" The relationship between concentration and performance has been perhaps the most
studied question in industrial organization. One interpretation is that higher concentration
facilitates collusion, tacit or explicit, and thereby leads to higher profits. The alternative view
is that both high concentration and high industry profits result from the presence in an in-
dustry of a core of more efficient firms. For a critical overview of the literature, see F.
Scherer, Industrial Market Structure and Economic Performance 267-95 (2d ed. 1980). The
efficiency hypothesis is associated with and was first tested by Demsetz. See Demsetz, Indus-
try Structure, Market Rivalry, and Public Policy, 16 J.L: & Econ. 1 (1973); see also Peltzman,
The Gains and Losses from Industrial Concentration, 20 J.L. & Econ. 229 (1977) (efficiency
effects of concentration predominate).
Banking economists interpret the literature similarly. See, e.g., Heggestad, Comment on
"Bank Market Structure and Competition: A Survey," 16 J. Money, Credit & Banking 645,
648-49 (1984). In criticizing a survey of the empirical literature on bank scale economies and
the effects of bank concentration, Heggestad concludes that, although prior studies may be
slightly dated, "the major conclusions still stand. The conclusion that massive size is not
needed for efficiency has not been altered. Neither has the conclusion that reductions in entry
barriers or increases in the number and viability of competitors is in the public interest." Id.
at 649.
Flannery provides some measure of the costs of unit banking restrictions to consumers.
See Flannery, The Social Costs of Unit Banking Restrictions, Working Paper No. 82-5 (Fed.
Reserve Bank of Philadelphia) (1982). Using 1978 data, Flannery compares profits and costs
[Vol. 73:301
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C. A Note on the Dual Banking System
The current regulatory system allows banks to be chartered on
either the federal or state level and thus to decide which of two dif-
ferent sets of rules will govern their activity. Moreover, banks have
the ability to switch their status at any time. The existence of paral-
lel state and federal regulatory authorities is referred to as the "dual
banking system."98
The dual banking system has been criticized on two grounds. The
first is that it is wasteful to have two sets of regulators performing
essentially the same function. The second criticism is the familiar
argument that allowing banks to choose which set of regulations to
be bound by creates a race to the bottom in which regulators have
incentives to adopt lax rules to attract charters.
Although the existence of twin sets of regulators will inevitably
impose some duplication costs, the race-to-the-bottom argument
lacks merit.9 9 Because chartering requirements have operated in
practice as an anticompetitive barrier to entry, any competition
among regulatory bodies that makes entry easier is beneficial. In
other words, so long as entry is regulated on grounds having nothing
to do with the safety and soundness of the banking system, the
more competition among regulators, the better.
The benefits of the dual banking system have been undermined,
however, by the doctrine of competitive equality. Under this doc-
trine, which has been codified in several provisions of federal law 00
of unit banks in states where branching is permitted and those where it is not. He finds
higher profits in states where branching is restricted yet costs are also higher. Thus, the
higher profits reflect supracompetitive prices paid by customers. He estimates the injury to
consumers from unit banking restrictions to be $512 million annually.
18 See Scott, The Dual Banking System: A Model of Competition in Regulation, 30 Stan. L.
Rev. 1 (1977). State banks, however, are eligible for federal deposit insurance. Those that
elect this option must comply with regulations promulgated by the FDIC, reducing the differ-
ence in the regulatory enviroment faced by state and federal banks.
" The race-to-the-bottom argument has been made most frequently in connection with
state chartering of corporations. See Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law:. Reflections upon
Delaware, 83 Yale L.J. 663 (1974). The theory has now been discredited both theoretically
and empirically. See Baysinger & Butler, The Role of Corporate Law in the Theory of the
Firm, 28 J.L. & Econ. 179 (1985); Dodd & Leftwich, The Market for Corporate Charters:
"Unhealthy Competition" Versus Federal Regulation, 53 J. Bus. 259 (1980); Fischel, The
"Race to the Bottom" Revisited: Reflections on Recent Developments in Delaware's Corpora-
tion Law, 76 Nw. U.L. Rev. 913 (1982); Romano, Law as a Product: Some Pieces of the Incor-
poration Puzzle, 1 J.L. Econ. & Organization 225 (1985); Winter, State Law, Shareholder Pro-
tection, and the Theory of the Corporation, 6 J. Legal Stud. 251 (1977).
I00 See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 36(c) (1982) (national bank may establish branch "if such estab-
lishment and operation are... authorized to State banks by the statute law of the State in
question"); id. § 1842(d) (out-of-state holding companies can acquire bank only if acquisition
1987]
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and extended by judicial decision,10 1 any competitive advantage that
national banks might have over state banks is deemed inappropri-
ate. This policy has frustrated attempts by banks to opt out of re-
strictive state laws by becoming national banks. 102
If competitive equality is deemed to be a goal of banking regula-
tion, there is no point in having a dual banking system. Why have
two systems when competitive equality requires that they both be
the same? The preferable course, however, is to retain the dual
banking system-at least so long as entry barriers exist-and aban-
don the doctrine of competitive equality. If there were no such doc-
trine, banks would have strong incentives to be chartered under the
rules that best allow them to meet consumer demand. Under the
present system, by contrast, banks lack incentive to innovate
around restrictive regulations because such an attempt might vio-
late the regulatory policy of protecting existing competitors.
V. BANK HOLDING COMPANIES AS A SOURCE OF STRENGTH
The Bank Holding Company Act requires that approval be ob-
tained from the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
whenever a company acquires control of a bank.103 One of the crite-
ria that the Board must consider is the financial resources, or capi-
tal adequacy, of the proposed holding company. 0 4 This requirement
"is specifically authorized by the statute laws of the State in which such bank is located").
101 See, e.g., First Nat'l Bank v. Dickinson, 396 U.S. 122 (1969) (holding that the definition
of branch under federal law must be interpreted broadly because of the principle of competi-
tive equality); First Nat'l Bank v. Walker Bank & Trust Co., 385 U.S. 252 (1966) (same); see
also Northeast Bancorp, Inc. v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 472 U.S. 159
(1985) (states may allow entry of out-of-state holding companies located in some states but
not others). For an analysis of Northeast Bancorp, see Miller, Interstate Banking in the
Court, 1985 Sup. Ct. Rev. 179.
102 First Nat'l Bank v. Dickinson, 396 U.S. 122 (1969), illustrates this point. The state law
at issue prohibited branch banking by state banks. A national bank attempted to circumvent
this restriction by establishing an armored car service and a shopping center depository set up
in such a way as to avoid the literal definition of "branch" under federal law. See id. at 126-
29. A branch is defined as any place of business "at which deposits are received, or checks
paid, or money lent." 12 U.S.C. § 36(f) (1982). The national bank attempted to avoid this
definition by, for example, providing contractually that deposits were not received until they
reach the main office. See First Nat'l Bank, 396 U.S. at 126-29. Nevertheless, the Supreme
Court emphasized that the principle of competitive equality was relevant in construing
"branch" and held that the bank could not gain a competitive edge over state banks by pro-
viding a service to consumers that state banks were prohibited from offering. See id. at 136-
37.
103 See 12 U.S.C. § 1842 (1982).
104 See id.; see also Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. v. First Lincolnwood Corp.,
439 U.S. 234, 243 (1978) (construing this provision of the Bank Holding Company Act).
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is designed to ensure that the holding company will be a source of
strength for its subsidiary bank.10 5 The goal is to make sure that the
holding company will have sufficient capital to invest in the bank. A
related goal is to ensure that the holding company will not use its
control to cause the bank to pay excessive dividends and thereby
weaken the bank's financial condition.
The rationale for this form of entry regulation is that bank hold-
ing companies with relatively low debt-equity ratios will be more
likely to invest in, and less likely to withdraw funds from, their sub-
sidiary banks.10 6 The validity of this assumption, however, is ques-
tionable at best. That a holding company is well-capitalized should
have no effect on its willingness to invest in a bank. This decision
should be solely a function of whether the investment has a positive
net present value to the holding company. If it does, the investment
can be financed with either debt or equity or by use of retained
earnings. If it does not, it will not be pursued regardless of the avail-
ability of funds. Whatever funds are available will either be invested
in other projects, distributed to shareholders, or held as retained
earnings.
The capital structure of the holding company is also irrelevant to
its incentive to use control to withdraw funds from the bank. Hold-
ing companies are shareholders of banks; depositors are creditors of
banks. One form of conflict that always exists between shareholders
and creditors of any firm is the incentive that shareholders have to
withdraw funds from the firm and thereby divert to themselves as-
sets that are at least partially owned by creditors. This conflict ex-
ists in the bank context as well. But the severity of this conflict is
unaffected by the capital structure of the particular shareholder or
by whether the stock was purchased on margin. The reason is that
the payment of debt is only one of an infinite number of possible
uses of those funds. Put differently, if it is profitable to withdraw
assets to meet interest payments, it is equally profitable to with-
draw assets for other purposes.
If the "source of strength" rationale, with its emphasis on capital
structure, does not justify regulating the formation of holding com-
panies, it is useful to ask whether any other criteria are more rele-
105 See Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. v. First Lincolnwood Corp., 439 U.S.
234 (1978), where the Court deferred to the Board's denial of an application for holding com-
pany status based solely on the Board's "frequently reiterated" policy that "holding compa-
nies should be a source of strength to subsidiary financial institutions." Id. at 251.
10 Id.
1987]
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vant to a company's fitness to own a bank. Other possibilities in-
clude managerial talent (a factor that is considered under current
law) and the reputational interest of the holding company in having
its subsidiaries be successful. 107 Unfortunately, the prospects of reg-
ulators being able to determine in advance which large shareholders
(holding companies) will loot or mismanage the bank are remote.10 8
The more likely result is that these criteria, or others like them, will
be used in anticompetitive ways to frustrate transfers of control.10 9
VI. CONCLUSION
Banks are different from other types of firms in that they are
more susceptible to me-first behavior by creditors. Federal deposit
insurance is best understood as a regulatory response to this pris-
oner's dilemma faced by bank depositors. Yet many other current
regulations, particularly activity and geographic restrictions, as well
as regulations governing the formation of bank holding companies,
have nothing to do with the reasons why banks are different from
other types of firms and thus serve no useful social purpose.
101 The capital structure of the holding company is not completely irrelevant. The greater
the total amount of debt-meaning debt at the bank, holding company, and personal
level-the greater the incentive of the shareholder who has control over the bank to cause it
to invest in risky projects.
108 For a general discussion of this point outside the context of banking, see Easterbrook &
Fischel, Corporate Control Transactions, 91 Yale L.J. 698 (1982).
,0" For a summary of the evidence on the efficiency gains resulting from transfers of con-
trol, see Jensen & Ruback, The Market for Corporate Control: The Scientific Evidence, 11 J.
Fin. Econ. 1 (1983).
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